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I

Recalling the abrupt changes in American national security policy in 1953 and 1961, one may well ask: What "New Look" should we expect now? What should we want? Probably changes will emerge more temperately and slowly than they did in those years. To our friends abroad, overly sensitized as they have become to policy modifications, this prospect should be reassuring. Much as they tend to sympathize with dissent within the United States over Vietnam, they realize that our domestic furor over this tragic war threatens to induce a generalized neo-isolationism. Arguments for neo-isolationism have a powerful appeal, but tend to cloud debate about the real issues for long-term security policy choice: What doctrine, military force structure, budgets, and plans?

II

A backward glance at the "New Looks" of 1953 and 1961, with stress upon budgetary competition because it is again paramount, supplies a starting point. The 1952 Presidential campaign and the aftermath of the Korean War offer some parallels. Despite pressures for continued high military budgets to sustain then-current plans for a fast military buildup for NATO, the annual rate of federal spending for national defense, measured in 1958 dollars, fell by no less than \$16.5 billion (27 percent) in the two years immediately following General Eisenhower's assumption of office.²

A minor budget cut was automatic, because large stockpiles left over from the Korean War replaced current production for a time. But the major reduction supposedly reflected the well-known change in national security policy. As the "New Look" of 1953 relied primarily but not exclusively (1) upon nuclear weapons and (2) upon retaliation at places and times of our choosing, it removed the rationale by which military planners might otherwise have generated large requirements for conventional capabilities at places and times of an enemy's choosing.³

For all the Eisenhower Administration's insistence upon a tidy National Security Council coordination of policy and grave attention to doctrine, the driving force was economic dogma. The budget cutting began before the doctrine was formulated, not afterward, with predictably chaotic results in the Pentagon. A military planner is trained to guard against adversity. When faced with budget austerity imposed by overriding domestic priorities, he tries to protect future military options as best he can. He will seek to preserve balance among military capabilities, even if at dangerous levels of risk.

But the 1953 "New Look" not only lacked clear doctrinal guidance in advance, but any system for relating such guidance to non-existent long-term military budgets. Faced with divergent views among the military Services, it produced a long-term force structure characterized by imbalance among inconsistent capability options. Only the Air Force stood ready to embrace "Massive Retaliation" whole-heartedly, and to banish sizable conventional capabilities beyond recall. Even in this Service a minority view stood opposed, in support of a beleaguered U.S. Army. The U.S. Navy, for its part, somehow contrived to rationalize both a new Polaris system for city-destruction and its older sizable convoy capabilities for sustained (conventional?) high-intensity warfare. Logistic planning did not mesh: "Army planning, for example, was based primarily on a long war of attrition; Air Force planning was based, largely, on a short war of nuclear bombardment."⁴

Would it have been better if our Services had struck a balance among their capabilities consistent with the published doctrine during

1953-1960, and thus achieved better "cost-effectiveness," narrowly defined, for the professed policy? Probably it was better that future options were wastefully preserved than not preserved at all. In any event, the ability of our military Services to preserve inconsistent doctrines, and thus to "live and let live" with each other, accounts for the central budgetary paradox of the Eisenhower Administration. After the early sharp cut, military outlays remained surprisingly high, because the economies implicit in the professed doctrine were never realized. The military share of the Gross National Product (GNP), once sharply cut from a wartime 13.5 percent to 9.7 percent in those first two years, thereafter fluctuated on a quarterly basis between a high of 10.4 percent and an outgoing low (second quarter, 1960), of 8.8 percent of GNP. Or, if one removes fluctuations from the denominator to get a fairer test of military outlays as a proportion of potential (no recession) GNP, these quarterly highs and lows during the last six years of the Eisenhower Administration become 10.3 percent and 8.2 percent respectively. By the same measure, military outlays during calendar 1965 took but 7.0 percent of the potential GNP, at the low point of the Kennedy/Johnson Administrations.⁵ Prominent contemporary critics who would cut our post-Vietnam military outlays to 5 percent or less of our GNP in the 1970s,⁶ would, in effect, take us back all the way to a 1948 standard.⁷

The seeming budgetary austerity of the McNamara era reflects its capitalization upon some multiple-option capabilities that, despite professed Eisenhower doctrine, had been preserved. It was far quicker and cheaper to remove imbalances among capabilities than to replace wholly dissipated capabilities. Restoring racks to carry conventional bombs in airplanes, for example, was much easier than re-creating a tactical air force. Speeding vulnerability-reducing measures for hardened and mobile strategic missile systems that had already been begun was likewise easier than creating new systems. The immediate rise in military outlays under President Kennedy, \$5.2 billion in one year in the same constant 1958 dollars (a 10.3 percent increase),⁷

sought to remove imbalances quickly, following which the same goal was pursued at steadily diminishing outlay levels until Vietnam.

Such is the budgetary paradox. "Flexible response" and "multiple options" express an expensive policy, when coupled as they were in the 1961 "New Look" with no less ambitious foreign commitments and obligations. In brief, the Eisenhower Administration pursued an inexpensive national security policy expensively, which has direct import for President Nixon. If he seeks an immediate impressive cut in non-Vietnam outlays, as well as an honorable end to the war, he will not be able to start by pitting a five-star "military judgment" against the four-star collective view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as could President Eisenhower. Neither will he be able to find glaring imbalances among military capabilities which -- in contrast to the Kennedy/McNamara measures to restore components in short supply -- he might try to rectify by removing components in abundant supply.

III

The clearest budgetary moral of the contrasting 1953 and 1961 "New Looks" is that an economizing doctrine supplies a necessary, but by no means sufficient, condition for efficiency in the Pentagon. Beyond a doctrine, an effective policy-policing system is needed. Secretary McNamara supplied one, and the first step toward improving it (which needs to be done) is to understand it. The military staffs came to understand it quickly. As one general put it bitterly to this author, recalling the pleasant fiction that an American Congress would never tolerate a unified military Service and a "Prussian" general staff: "We have a Unified Commander, and his name is McNamara." Surprisingly, relevant Congressional Committees were slower in comprehending and reacting to the new system. Observers in the International Relations community were still slower, waiting in vain for a comprehensive published doctrine. Secretary McNamara's

tremendous intellectual ability for solving policy problems quantitatively carried with it an underappreciation of published abstract doctrine ("theology"), which is useful in clarifying and unifying conceptual issues for a vast bureaucracy whose members tend "not to get the word." So the academics would not have found a doctrinal bible for the "New Look" of 1961, even if they had looked in the right place, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and they looked in vain for an accepted one from the National Security Council or the Department of State.

The relevant examination question, to test whether one understands the McNamara System, is: "Define and explain the role and function of Draft Presidential Memoranda (DPMs), trace their annual review cycle, and relate them to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) produced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."⁸ Only those who pass this test qualify to criticize the system, as few outsiders did while Secretary McNamara was in office. Thus it was not until 1968 that the key Senate Committee on strategic preparedness, understandably piqued at being denied access to these documents as privileged Executive Branch communications, pinpointed the roles of the DPMs: "In fact, the Draft Presidential Memoranda, which are issued by the Secretary of Defense and which are the basic decisions in the strategic and other military fields, except the one dealing with research and development, are drafted and prepared in the Systems Analysis Office. These control the military budget, force planning and procurement."⁹

A bureaucratic revolution occurred in the Pentagon between 1961 and 1968. Its formal Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System (PPBS), which "would be a shell without substance were it not backed by the full range of analytical support which operations research and other modern management techniques can bring to bear on national security problems," has been overemphasized. The vital change was in managerial philosophy: a public manager "can either act as a judge or a leader."¹⁰ Ex-President of General Motors Charles Wilson, in his tenure as Secretary of Defense, settled the force planning issues that the Joint Chiefs brought before him only because they could not

agree; the ex-President of Ford seized the leadership and initiative in determining force plans. The JSOP remains in the same military hands, with the useful addition that its long-term requirements are ultimately costed. But it became influential under McNamara only as it, and related military studies, altered the DPMS that were drafted and redrafted in the Systems Analysis Office. Thus physical force structure planning -- numbers and types of units (e.g., Army divisions) and of weapon systems (e.g., Polaris/Poseidon submarines) -- was unified for the first time with financial planning for the same units over comparably long planning periods. With such functional unification came centralization (too much?) in mainly civilian hands (too little military professional judgment?), and resultant burning resentment from the Services.

The Systems Analysis Office became the focal point for this resentment, in particular, because it forced the budgetary debates to be conducted in terms uncongenial to the Services. Proponents of new weapons or new forces were required to articulate reasons for expected greater cost-effectiveness, rather than greater effectiveness alone. They also had to expect that their most persuasive arguments would, in a different context, be used against them. As proposer of a new system, a Service spokesman will tend to reflect glowing estimates of American performance against a future enemy. Yet, more generally, because a military planner deals in risky futures, his intelligence estimates tend to err on the side of predicting high enemy capabilities. One jolting corrective, from the Systems Analysis Office, was to replace an intelligence estimate of a "12 feet tall" enemy with the "6 feet tall" enemy implicit in the "sales brochure" for the new American system. Then the quantitative information supplied by one spokesman for a Service would undermine that supplied by another. A more general procedure was to cost the total enemy force posture generated by military intelligence estimates, compare them with reasonable total budgetary limits for the enemy, and request the intelligence community to reduce the incompatibility between the two sets of estimates. To military traditionalists, the entire procedure seemed dangerously fraudulent. They were forced to generate more quantitative information than ever

before, fully aware that their numbers might be used in other contexts and might be misused in inexperienced hands. Their intense resentment is easily understandable, and sometimes justified.

A return to uncontested traditional military intelligence estimates, however, is not justifiable. What philosophy about risk should guide long-term military planning? To choose the higher of two competing estimates about future enemy capabilities is to follow a conservative precept that is in order when, but only when, high confidence is required in particular future U.S. counter-capabilities. To follow this practice at all times is to deny future U.S. and allied medium and low-confidence capabilities even a fair hearing, and to allow a conservative precept to generate radical outcomes by default. Two outcomes, in particular, tend to result. First, overestimation of enemy capabilities can, when reciprocated by the enemy, over-fuel an action-reaction arms race. Second, overestimation of enemy conventional capabilities can generate such defeatism that nuclear alternatives are adopted.

The policy-policing McNamara method fought these deplorable tendencies, imperfectly but effectively. A responsible "New Look" in 1969 will require both a consistent set of strategic policies and a no less effective, but hopefully less abrasive and improved, implementing method. What should they be? And how can they be better related to international affairs?

IV

For a consistent set of strategic policies we need, above all, an appropriate complementarity between our Strategic Retaliatory Forces and our General Purpose (or overseas-theater oriented) Forces. One can begin with either set of Forces, but for our purposes it is better to begin with the issues posed for our General Purpose Forces.

For one thing, President Nixon immediately escaped his campaign rhetoric on Strategic Forces with the smooth semantic glide from

"superiority" to "sufficiency." As he commissioned a study of an all-volunteer Armed Services, however, he left open the possibility that this reasonable prospect might be rationalized by one of his least reasonable campaign statements: "Korea was probably our last conventional war. Those we must prepare against in the future are either nuclear exchanges, in which the draft would be irrelevant, or guerrilla wars."¹¹ This quotation is from a considered statement on national security policy solicited from each Presidential candidate, and may accordingly be more difficult to disavow than a casual declaration.

Should we really prepare General Purpose Forces thus to be ready to fight only the most immediately experienced, and hopefully atypical, war? Anyway, a neat boundary line between conventional and guerrilla wars is misleading. Granted, if our forces were to be involved in Vietnam at all, we should probably have concentrated more upon the security of dense local populations, and concentrated less upon seeking mass battles in remote and sparsely populated areas. Even if we had done so, however, with greater emphasis upon effective local administration and security, the Viet Cong would have done all they could to overpower local security forces. The resultant escalation by degree would soon meet anyone's definition of conventional war. That local security forces be adequately protected at all times from large-unit attack is indispensable in effective counterinsurgency, which requires overwhelming on-call conventional retaliatory capabilities. Vietnam doubtless yields thousands of lessons on how to use conventional power more skillfully and less destructively. It yields no lesson at all on dispensing with it altogether, even for such a war and still less for other contingencies.

There was no campaign call in 1968 for revival of "Massive Retaliation" as an all-purpose doctrine. Nonetheless, specifically for possible Asian contingencies, we may get to this doctrine indirectly via less ambitious global policy guidance for General Purpose Force structures and logistic capabilities. The most vulnerable target for would-be economizers is supplied by the inherited

guidance: "to provide forces that can meet one major contingency in NATO, one major contingency elsewhere, plus"¹² [presumably one or more minor contingencies]. An economizer's alternative objective for General Purpose Forces might be the ability to meet only one major contingency at a time, not "two plus" contingencies.

Such an alternative objective might be formulated more sharply by specifying which theater of possible major operations, Europe or Asia, was to take priority. If it were so formulated, Europe would be stressed in all probability. One then gets some variant of "massive retaliation" doctrine for Asia by default. Proponents of the 1953 "New Look" used 1953 weaknesses in Soviet tactical nuclear weaponry as a bad, but effective, argument for emphasizing U.S. and NATO nuclear capabilities for years when these Soviet weaknesses would have disappeared. So contemporary planners might use China's present weakness to justify neglecting non-nuclear defense preparedness against China tomorrow. Or our planning might simply gamble on possible enemies not having any aggressive intentions, and so fail to provide specific countercapabilities.

A new Administration's options are constrained by a much longer half-life for U.S. doctrine abroad than at home. The paramount example is NATO. Between the early 1961 "New Look" and the formal adoption of "Flexible Response" by the North Atlantic Council ministerial session on December 19, 1967, "following the first comprehensive review of NATO's strategy since 1956,"¹³ NATO international planners were still formally bound by 1956-57 doctrine!

For the planning of General Purpose Forces, one always begins with the NATO problem. NATO outspends and outmans the Warsaw Pact, but it has never converted this potential for conventional superiority into actuality. Specifically, even when U.S. forces temporarily added for Vietnam are excluded: "NATO has 30 percent more men under arms [5,470,000 vs. 4,200,000] than the Warsaw Pact"; ... has more total manpower in its "Division Forces in the Center Region [677,000 vs. 619,000]; ... [and] a detailed examination of equipment indicates no area where the Pact's different structure provides a major relative

advantage."¹⁴ NATO's members do not fail to spend and draft men for defense, contrary to prevailing defeatist beliefs. NATO's main problem is its inefficiency in translating these resources into relevant fighting capabilities. Worse, given such inefficiency, its military posture is dangerous as well as wasteful. Its tactical air forces have been glaringly vulnerable even to conventional attack,¹⁵ and will remain vulnerable in all probability to nuclear attack. To be conventionally inadequate, while well-stocked with vulnerable tactical nuclear weapons that look ominous to the possible enemy, is a planner's nightmare. That is what we have in Europe.

V

When inefficiency is also dangerous, its sources are worth probing. A coalition is inefficient because each member, in seeking forces that are nationally "balanced," procures forces and weapon systems that could more efficiently be supplied by others. One expects such diseconomies, and tries to mobilize international suasion to hold them to moderate proportions. As for France, naturally, nobody any longer is naive enough to expect General De Gaulle to be moved other than negatively by suasion. The high costs to NATO of French geographic denial and reduced forces bring only the consolation of French abstention when the North Atlantic Council, reassembled as The Defense Committee of Fourteen, gets down to serious business. Nobody else in NATO so flagrantly upsets a semi-reasonable division of military labor.

The sources for NATO inefficiency go beyond understandable, if deplorable, national lapses from the goal of balanced collective forces. They are to be found in geography, compounded by overly ambitious force and weapon system unit designs and, more generally, by overly ambitious objectives for military performance relative to available resources. Geographic considerations obviously pose special problems for the extreme flanks. A rugged terrain in Northern Norway

and Eastern Turkey is coupled, in the former case, with a much sparser population and fewer troops than in the latter, while each differs from the Central Front. But positive Norwegian views toward NATO conventional defense stem from their interest in defusing dangers in Central Europe, and not from misconceptions about the feasibility of purely local defense of their extreme north. The Turks' mixed views toward such NATO defense relate in a different, but equally important way, to NATO's Central Front. Their doubts about local defense are magnified by NATO concepts that have been imported from the Central Front for use in defending Thrace. Hence the traditional focus upon the Central Front is justified, both because the main allies are directly involved there and because NATO-wide doctrine is determined by this one Front, if more than it should be.

To understand the governing geographic constraint, one needs only a map of Europe and a piece of string. The shorter the front to be defended, other things being equal, the more feasible a local defense will be. Early plans for NATO defense, given small forces to begin with, realistically started with the natural barrier of the Rhine river to reinforce holding capabilities, and extended this defense line along a South-North axis to the North Sea. Such a defense front is little more than 400 miles long, and could be kept to this dimension as one moved east to lesser river barriers in the middle of The Federal Republic, but not as one moved beyond them:

"It has always been an aim of the Alliance to defend physically the territory of NATO Europe as far forward as possible, but realization of this aim has been conditioned by the forces actually available to achieve it. For example, in the early days of NATO the best we could do in Central Europe was to man a defence based upon river obstacles deep in our own territory. With the strengthening of our forces in recent years, the defences have steadily moved forward, as, indeed, they should.... the need, however, is not only for increased numbers. To fight an effective mobile defence requires greater tactical mobility, more armour, more conventional fire power and better logistical support than is found at present ... [and] some restationing is needed."16

The combination of forward defense in geography and mobile defense in concept yields the most expensive possible defense of the Central Front. Let one's piece of string follow every bend and curve in the Eastern boundary of The Federal Republic, and one traces a front of about 650 miles. A forward defense thus involves a front about 50 percent longer than a straight north-south defense line to the rear. This ambitious task was left for General Lemnitzer by his predecessor as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe: "If you have lost the forward area, why, in that instance, try to hold even the line of the Rhine? ... I established the forward concept when we didn't have the military means and I was criticized by many military people for having done this."¹⁷

Prevalent defeatism about conventional defense in NATO is now easy to understand. All those men normally stationed in Division Forces in NATO's Center Region make up, at most, 28 2/3 divisions, when 5 French divisions are hesitatingly included.¹⁸ Suppose this total were an even 30 divisions. Even then, with a large front to cover, a mobile defense whose rationale rests upon its flexibility and speed would keep a minimum of 10 to 15 divisions in immediate strategic reserve ("linebackers," in a football analogy), leaving at most 20 divisions forward. Divide a 600 mile long front among 20 divisions, and one gets average frontages per forward division of 30 miles each. Is a NATO division, although bigger and more expensive than its Warsaw Pact counterpart, so much better that it can cover such a wide front?

The prevailing answer, among generals in NATO, is flatly negative. Their professional counsel is the one heeded by European member governments, not least because it inadvertently supplies the best excuse for failing to make the effort to improve one's own forces. Why correct qualitative deficiencies in conventional forces if they are going to be deemed quantitatively inadequate in any case? A perception that the number of divisions will still be inadequate, because too thinly spread, is utterly devastating. It destroys the argument that the expected numerical advantage for a local defender against an attacker --

which varies with terrain and many other considerations, but is typically expressed as 3:1 -- can be generalized to the entire front. To generalize this advantage is a fallacy of composition unless one's forces combine sufficient thickness and mobility. With NATO divisions spread over such thin divisional frontages, an enemy can exploit gaps between them.

Such is the standard professional military judgment that dominates European political views. Worse yet, military comparisons are typically expressed merely in numbers of opposed divisions, so that the greater number of Warsaw Pact divisions normally in the Center Region (46) is contrasted to NATO's (at best $28 \frac{2}{3}$), rather than the lesser total number of men in Warsaw Pact Division Forces (619,000 vs. 677,000). An average NATO "Division Force," which is 80 percent larger than the Pact's in manpower and other inputs¹⁹ is not credited with anything like an 80 percent greater capability. These statistics are misused by some to generate undue pessimism about NATO defense: "'NATO is outnumbered by the Warsaw Pact on the central front by more than two to one in infantry formations and nearly three to one in armored formations. The Warsaw Pact superiority in aircraft is nearly two to one,' the British Defense Minister said."²⁰ Life's main editorial immediately compounded the error: "The Warsaw Pact powers now outman NATO three to one in armored brigades, two to one in both infantry and aircraft."²¹ The same statistics are equally misused by others to generate undue optimism about existing NATO defense, as they ignore the "thinness" and maldeployment of NATO divisions relative to forward defense geography, and only count the total manpower and related inputs rather than the outputs: "Currently, NATO forces on the central front are roughly in balance with the opposing Warsaw Pact forces west of the Soviet frontier, measured in terms of capacity to fight a conventional ground war; indeed, the NATO forces immediately available probably have some qualitative superiority on the central front, especially in terms of aircraft."²²

The greater NATO resource investment in conventional forces does not provide an equilibrium in Europe measured in capacity to fight

conventionally because (1) unit designs for its forces are typically very complicated and expensive. As the paramount example, a division for "mobile defense" is supposed to provide some form of mechanized transport for each infantryman for speedy, off-road, flexible deployment. Thus one compounds cost per unit, because heavy initial equipment investments translate, via maintenance standards, into large manpower noncombat requirements. For any given total budget level, higher costs per division translate into fewer divisions. Meanwhile, (2) NATO commanders have moved the intended battle-line forward, which calls for a greater number of divisions to cover a longer front, not a smaller number. A manager of a professional football team would be following the NATO analogy, to return to our metaphor, if he invests in such expensive players that he is unable to field eleven of them regularly.

This perspective would not be so distressing if, with respect to conventional capabilities, NATO had planned well to emphasize mobilization rather than immediate readiness; or, with respect to nuclear capabilities, had planned well for a good substitute for conventional preparedness. An emphasis upon mobilization capabilities would fit the prevailing relaxed political appraisal of today's Soviet intent, if not its capabilities. NATO governments are fully prepared to gamble that the probability of Soviet surprise attack upon them, without ample political warning, is small. Yet for nearly twenty years NATO has emphasized nominally ready forces and de-emphasized reserve forces. Our most optimistic of authoritative sources about potential NATO superiority in ready forces concedes Warsaw Pact "advantages in reinforcement capabilities" that might be overcome "if we organized ourselves efficiently to do it"; specifically, if the many Europeans who have finished their training tours of duty, "were organized into fully equipped ready reserve units."²³ Here is a call for quantity as well as quality in reserve units, as few reserve divisions exist in Western Europe. Yet, after Czechoslovakia, the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session proclaimed that, "The quality of reserve forces will also be improved"; while the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, stresses "an improvement in the quality of our forces, not the quantity."²⁴

One can be just as gloomy about good nuclear substitutes for conventional capabilities in NATO. How one could design a theater posture for two-sided tactical nuclear warfare remains hotly disputed among the theorists. Their paper designs typically stress not only the removal of obvious vulnerabilities, especially within a sophisticated command, control, and communications system for complex battle management, but hyperdispersal of one's own forces to reduce their vulnerability as well. Such dispersal dissipates conventional capabilities in advance, and therefore logically requires predelegated authority to military commanders to use nuclear weapons against enemies who suddenly confront one's missing conventional capabilities.

Hence, naturally, alternative designs for tactical nuclear preparedness remain contested in studies and papers, while none is implemented in practice. Refashioning NATO's physical military posture in Europe for any such preparedness would require a European willingness to invest large resources. This willingness has been notably absent. There are natural suspicions that the only purpose in making Europe an efficient nuclear battleground is to create conditions favoring a joint sanctuary for U.S./Soviet territory. The necessary resources have been and will continue to be missing. Further, while they allege that their fear is that some other government may veto the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis, most European governments adamantly refuse to predelegate nuclear authority to anybody. Defense Minister Healey, much as he depreciates conventional capabilities for NATO, could announce to the House of Commons that he had assented to pre-delegating nuclear authority to German and Turkish military commanders only if his statement were coupled with his Government's resignation. Among European Defense Ministers, Minister Healey on this point is not untypical. The military requirements for an efficient tactical nuclear defense in Europe are flatly incompatible with political imperatives, with the predictable result.

The deterrent virtue that can be drawn from this planner's vice is that if NATO's posture frightens us this much, it will surely frighten the Soviets enough. Perhaps it will. We have created a

large escalatory machine, with the prospect that any conflict in Europe might necessitate or even tempt early recourse to nuclear weapons, but with no assurance that two-sided nuclear warfare would either be advantageous to or be controllable by NATO. The ultimate deterrent, U.S. strategic retaliatory power external to the European theater, might have to be invoked in some form. Therefore, it had better be available in an appropriate form. Yet, however tailored, this ultimate deterrent could surely be used only as a dangerous low-confidence measure. Lesser dependence upon it, by way of improved theater design, is militarily desirable. It may also be politically desirable, or governments may simply prefer to save money instead. One trusts that they will at least consider improved designs.

To be as blunt about solutions, for the moment, as we have been about problems, the answer is for NATO to replace its ground-force posture designs with Soviet designs. This answer has a great deal to commend it, not least its simplicity. First, if senior generals and Defense Ministers persist in counting divisions as divisions, ignoring great differences among divisions as if adding apples and oranges because fruit is fruit, then by all means let us generate more small divisions from the same resources. Specifically, by copying the Warsaw Pact divisional design, weaknesses as well as strengths, let NATO consider creating 50 Pact-style divisions on its Central Front from the identical manpower and other inputs that now yield but 28 2/3 Western-style divisions.²⁵ Then the perspective that results when a standard training-manual factor for the frontage that a "division" can cover would, for the front as a whole, yield a much less gloomy perspective as the factor was multiplied by the larger number of divisions.

Second, however, let us not convert all our Western-style ready divisions into 50 Pact-style divisions, but only into, say, 40 divisions. The remaining resources can be used to create significantly more than 10 less expensive reserve divisions, again Pact-style. Opposite Czechoslovakia militia-style reserve units could stand ready to defend prepared positions, as the most cost-effective of all

divisions. Understandable political resistance to prepared positions opposite East Germany would probably necessitate lesser efficiency elsewhere, but reserve divisions would still be less expensive.²⁶ Such a Soviet-style greater emphasis upon a mobilization base fits two crucial Western circumstances: (1) It conforms to prevailing political beliefs that there will be ample political warning about any adverse change in Soviet attitudes, permitting mobilization of such reserve units as exist. (2) It conforms to the vast increase in American lift capabilities and prepositioned equipment for its forces, and the enhanced readiness that is being achieved for priority U.S. reserve divisions. Here is the simple remedy. Let us put false pride aside, and for armies use the Soviet model for cost-effectiveness. It is the matching mobilization base that European NATO most needs.²⁷

In all probability, to copy the Soviet model is not the optimal remedy. Nothing so crude could be, save as its simplicity outweighs other drawbacks. We must consider how to get more sophisticated remedies. Our initial view of NATO problems, and the crude remedy, serves to remind us that it takes a good policy-policing system to implement a good policy. It reminds us that defense goals in territorial terms must fit feasibly forthcoming resources to achieve them. Note the remarkable personal flavor of, "I established the forward concept when we didn't have the military means."¹⁷ The Federal Republic of Germany was no doubt pleased.

Turkey was likewise pleased if others (the United States) were going to supply the military equipment to permit a forward, mobile defense of Thrace. Turkey had a sound traditional defense of the Straits (the Dardenelles and the Bosphorus) that could focus upon two exceedingly narrow land approaches from the European side, and accordingly be very simple, inexpensive, and yet effective. Still, as a member of NATO, could Turkey be denied a forward concept that was awarded to The Federal Republic? As a recipient of grant military assistance, however, her position differs from that of The Federal Republic. Is the U.S. Congress bound to supply the means for what

an international commander orders, with a different front primarily in mind? Will it? If not, is not the United States in greater trouble by far than if goals had been tailored to realistic prospects for military aid throughout?

The clearest non-NATO application of the moral is to post-Vietnam Southeast Asia, specifically to Thailand. There we have a SEATO commitment, reinforced by a 1962 bilateral understanding, to come to Thailand's aid in the event of overt Communist invasion. Insurgency in Thailand, we expect and hope, can be met by Thai forces alone. But it is ridiculous to suppose that a Thai army of but 95,000 men²⁸ could meet a Chinese/North Vietnamese overt invasion. Yet if we want to honor our commitment as efficiently and unobtrusively as possible, the first step is to ensure that no SEATO commander imposes as a binding precedent so costly an obligation, specifically in terms of forward defense, that the U.S. Congress will rebel against supplying the means for it.

Another principal U.S. commitment on the Asian mainland is to South Korea, where geography and strong local forces make forward defense not merely feasible, but especially cost-effective. To defend a front of but 153 miles, South Korea has an Army of 550,000 men, with 19 front-line infantry divisions.²⁹ Further, unlike NATO's, the troops are already deployed forward to fit the concept, within prepared positions that enhance their defensive effectiveness. One can therefore rightly generalize to the entire front local numerical advantages over an attacker. Given such Korean strength, and moderate geographic commitments elsewhere in Asia where comparable self-strength is lacking, total Asian increments to our General Purpose Force requirements can be moderate.

VI

Our sketch reaffirms that U.S. Strategic Retaliatory Forces must still provide greater backing for theater forces abroad than is necessary or desirable, at a time when Soviet counter-capabilities are

becoming so formidable as to make declaratory policies about strategic "superiority" bipolar, and when the number of nuclear powers must be expected to increase. The obligations to support theater forces, to counter Soviet capabilities, and to deter nuclear proliferation can best be related to each other by considering the need for "light" strategic attack preparedness. Such preparedness best explains the role, incidentally, for the much-publicized "thin" anti-ballistic-missile defense (ABM).

The 1961 "New Look" included the concept of "controlled nuclear response." Such a response can be large or small because its enduring element is omissions from a target list, not inclusions. In the special circumstances of 1961-1962, however, the concept tended to be too narrowly identified with a large counterforce attack upon the Soviet Union. Such an attack would, by various target and weapon constraints, nonetheless preserve Soviet cities as hostages for continuing deterrent power. This excessive declaratory emphasis upon control in large attacks reflected a since-vanished Soviet acute vulnerability, in a gradual trend that did not eliminate the options introduced in the 1961 policy revolution, but that made our officials less sanguine about any of them: "The strategy options for general nuclear war have not changed since 1962."³⁰

That these options have not changed in all this time is deplorable but understandable. It was hard enough to introduce any flexibility into plans for "general nuclear war." If ever their forces have to pay the price of penetrating stiff Soviet defenses, strategic military commanders want to hit every crucial target. General Wheeler, when questioned in 1968 about Secretary McNamara's famous 1962 Ann Arbor declaration that "the principal military objective in the event of nuclear war should be the destruction of the enemy's forces," succinctly replied, "That is Mr. McNamara speaking. Speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we still have adhered to our concept. Yes, you attack the urban industrial base, that is the population base and industry, but we have always held to the view that we must attack those forces of the Soviet Union which are able to inflict destruction on ourselves and our allies."³¹

Despite the great increase in protected Soviet strategic forces that makes recourse to such general nuclear war all but unthinkable, we must nonetheless provide ultimate support for deficient theater forces. In these circumstances we need plans for controlled nuclear strikes that fall observably short of general war. Such plans do not present good military options, but rather the least bad among options for contingencies that, by assumption, are desperate. Assume a losing conventional war or, worse, a losing tactical nuclear war. Then the hope is that a controlled nuclear strike, coupled with a suitable "hot-line" message, will not add fuel to the flames but rather will be, in Bernard Brodie's apt phrase, "a de-escalating device."³²

To stress Soviet schooling in accepting necessary retreat, rather than in emotionally retaliating, as Brodie does in emphasizing this hope, however, is to isolate one optimistic influence. From the same Bolshevik Code, one can just as aptly stress "Push to the Limit" maxims: "... that a major ruling group should derive policies from feelings rather than from a sober calculation of 'the relationship of forces' ... is most unlikely to happen to the 'experienced' ruling groups in the centers of the capitalistic world."³³ The Soviets may repose a similar hope in Western retreat after nuclear demonstrations. Our reading of the scholarly tea leaves tells us something, but not enough for us to have confidence in asymmetric benefits to the West from nuclear demonstration possibilities: "The Bolshevik code is highly ambiguous.... Bolshevik rules require either a maximum degree of a certain kind of conduct, without specifying a criterion; or, more frequently, a 'middle course between two extremes,' again without defining this further."³⁴

The import of Soviet capabilities is clearer. The Soviets hold Western Europe hostage with some 700 medium and intermediate-range missiles, among other means, and could conduct limited nuclear strikes with any portion of these forces. Further, they can assess the probability of penetrating nonexistent European ballistic missile defenses as being 100 percent, regardless of the size of their missile strike, for the foreseeable future. A similar option is available to the West

for hypothetical missile strikes against Eastern European targets. In short, either side could stage nuclear demonstrations in Central Europe, with a small number of missiles, without incurring an operational penalty from defenses effective against small attacks.

If we reach an early strategic arms agreement with the Soviet Union that bans ABM deployments on both sides, including Soviet dismantling of their current Galosh system, a similar option would be available for small missile strikes against the homeland of each superpower. At this late date, such an agreement is highly unlikely, and probably no longer desirable. The time to seek such agreement upon zero ABM, especially because missile defenses pose less formidable inspection problems than do limits upon offensive vehicles, was during the "New Look" of 1961 rather than 1969, as many of us then argued.³⁵ Now technology has made area missile defense of entire land masses feasible against light attacks. Such defense promises several utilities.

Who would argue for asymmetrical strategic postures that featured zero ABM for the United States and significant area ABM coverage for the Soviet Union? In response to any nuclear demonstration that we were forced to employ against Eastern Europe because of NATO conventional weakness, the Soviets could then counterdemonstrate against either Western Europe or the United States with a comparably light and yet effective attack. The first function of a thin ABM system for the United States, in my view, is to remove this asymmetry in strategic postures. We want the Soviet Union to be confident that any nuclear demonstration against the territory of the United States would be effective only because they employ an unmistakably heavy attack, with large numbers of high-confidence aids for penetrating defenses. In other words, we want to drive the Soviets to so conspicuously higher a level of counterdemonstration that they will be deterred by the greater risks of escalating to general nuclear war.

The rationale for a thin ABM system for the United States differs little, after all, from the rationale for air defense. We know that our airspace is not impervious, because high confidence can never be

put in airtight defense. At the same time, to abandon air defense entirely is to replace our low-to-medium confidence in it with publicly acknowledged zero confidence, which would be absurd. Such a posture would permit any nuclear power that could afford long-range airliners a free ride to American targets with bombs kicked from the hatch. Our modest air defense plans permit no enemy any assurance of a free ride. So it should be with anti-ballistic missile defense. There is much utility in low-to-medium confidence aerospace defense, precisely because it shifts the burden of desired high confidence in penetration capabilities, in a complicated and uncertain world, to the shoulders of the enemy. Upon even Soviet shoulders it is a considerable burden.

Our rationale for a thin ABM system should cover both a deliberate light attack from the Soviets, and any accidental attack. It should also provide an option for "hard-point" ABM defense for hardened retaliatory missile sites, as proposed for the "Safeguard" system. Increased hardness alone no longer promises sufficient protection: "This new basing concept of hardened and defended complexes currently appears to be the best long-term way to achieve the necessary survivability of the land-based force."³⁶

Finally, the system should provide area defense of the entire United States against light attacks from small nuclear powers. Our declaratory policy should have depreciated, rather than exaggerated, the need for this defense, because we should have the mainland Chinese out-deterred at all times from any use of their nuclear weapons. At the same time we might have quietly acknowledged that a small insurance premium was nonetheless worth paying for this added protection. A Chinese strategic weapon designer would then have to provide both survivability for his systems against qualitatively different U.S. and Soviet threats, and penetrative capability against qualitatively different U.S. and Soviet defenses as well. If Chinese leaders need any sober lessons, they will best come from their own strategic system designers as they explain their problems.

Our dilemma is to exploit these three ABM rationales reasonably, and yet make them an acknowledged part of a responsible arms control policy. We can resolve this dilemma. It will not be easy, fundamentally because the original ABM physical design, from which the Sentinel/Safeguard was subsequently derived, was oriented toward a thick system. The original design emphasized expensive radars and computers that, hopefully, could handle heavy attacks. To the extent that such ambitious radar/computer capabilities remain in the redesign for Sentinel/Safeguard, proponents of thick systems will be able to argue that more interceptor missiles (Spartans and Sprints) can be added at small incremental costs. Once their foot is in the door, they can exploit arguments that doubling expected physical effectiveness will increase costs by significantly less than two.

Such military proponents will find some support from a respectable minority within the community of academic strategists, who would reverse current heavy emphasis upon offense relative to defense. They argue that deterrence would still be strong at much lower mutual levels of U.S. and Soviet capabilities for "Assured Destruction," while mutual devastation would be much less if deterrence were to fail.³⁷ Their conclusion rests upon analyses which find that offense is not inexpensive relative to the new defense technologies. In these analyses, however, the offense is required to assume the burden of many uncertainties, at every stage of the calculations, by employing only high-confidence, and therefore expensive, aids for penetrating defenses. Such calculations are fair enough, provided one notes their converse. For heavy retaliatory attacks, both the United States and the Soviet Union would employ high-confidence penetration aids. At the same time, each would toss in a collection of light, low-confidence penetration aids that might work. Even a small nuclear power can use such inexpensive aids. In short, we know how to provide high-confidence retaliatory capabilities. Nobody knows how to provide high-confidence ABM systems against sophisticated heavy attacks in designs that, at every stage of the calculations for hypothetical missile exchanges, force the

defense rather than the offense to assume the worst about each uncertain element. There may lurk a fatal flaw in one's thick ABM, which enemies can cheaply exploit, and no confidence that a similar flaw is to be found in the posture of the other superpower. This possibility is enough to keep governments from embracing the unorthodox view that strategic postures should emphasize defense rather than offense.

Mutual investments in heavy ABM systems may be avoided by explicit agreements that arise from U.S./Soviet arms control negotiations. As an arbitrary but reasonable example, there might be an agreement that each side would deploy no more than 1,000 interceptor missiles within a thin area coverage of its territory. Such an explicit agreement would limit ABM expenditures, and on that score be mutually beneficial. It would also permit each superpower to police its military staffs who seek much more extensive deployments. At such a numerical limit, moreover, each of the multiple utilities from thin ABM deployments could be preserved. Specifically, there would be modest scope for additional U.S. interceptor deployments; all of which, perhaps as a stipulated part of the agreement, could be deployed only in defense of hardened missile silos rather than for additional protection of hostage cities.

The main hope for holding the line at thin ABM deployments comes from current offensive technological developments which supply the best possible deterrent to large investments in ABM systems. Why should the Soviets invest billions of rubles in a thick ABM system that promises to be ineffective against future large numbers of U.S. retaliatory vehicles? The large numbers include not merely multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV) from a single missile launcher, but Multiple-Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV), each one of which the defenses would have to treat as a threat against a separate target. Such vehicles are high-confidence penetration aids, because the cleverest conceivable defense discrimination could not dismiss them as mere decoys. Add, to repeat, a Soviet fear that some among the accompanying array of lower-confidence penetration aids

might also work, and one has a dismaying perspective of cost-ineffectiveness about thick ABM, for a Kosygin to ponder if not a Grechko.

Yet rather than capitalize upon this promising deterrent to thick ABMs, some of our most prominent academic strategists propose its antithesis. Thus Carl Kaysen would seek "a ban on new systems (specifically MIRVs and new launching platforms or vehicles)". Concretely, his preferred "197X" defense budget has a 40 percent reduction in the cost of strategic forces "to reflect the institution of a freeze," and a smaller reduction in Research and Development to reflect "the sharp slowing down of efforts to create new weapon systems."³⁸ Projected budgetary savings of this magnitude assume either an utterly unrealistic prediction about reaching quick agreement on a strategic freeze or, dangerously, a willingness to gamble upon a unilateral U.S. freeze. At this level of expenditure no new U.S. strategic programs could be funded at all.

Let us hope that U.S./Soviet talks on strategic arms limits proceed promptly and fruitfully. Yet we know that they will be complex, time-consuming, and bedeviled by the Soviet's traditional objections to any inspection on its territory. So let us further hope that this Soviet intransigence lessens. But it will surely not lessen to the point where foreign experts are permitted to peer inside missile warheads to verify the non-existence of a MIRV capability. Those who seek stability in mutual deterrence, in part because each side fears the unknown penetration aids contained within the other's warheads, will not accept such close inspection. Nor can external monitoring of Soviet tests provide high confidence in non-existent MIRV capabilities. We already know that the Soviets possess guidance and related necessary missile capabilities. They could test the critical mechanism for a MIRV capability--the ejector mechanism for a re-entry vehicle--with only one ejection per launch. Our test monitors would learn nothing.

Realistic hopes should be pinned to gross arms limits that can be inspected, supplemented to the maximum extent possible with on-site inspection, perhaps on a statistically randomized basis. The simplest

gross limits might be expressed in terms of numbers of bombers and missile launchers, coupled with agreements that any excess numbers were to be destroyed rather than transferred to any other nation. More sophisticated limits--for example, upon the aggregate payload weight for total missile forces on each side--would be still better in principle, but inspection requirements would become more onerous. Many permutations and combinations are possible in an arms agreement, with great opportunities for mutual gain, and yet with considerable risk that vulnerabilities will be enhanced rather than decreased. Consequently enormous demands will be put upon the negotiators. Nonetheless, the negotiators can and should proceed.

They need not be rushed, however, by currently prevalent alarmism. Even sophisticated observers mislead us. Thus an ex-director of the Bureau of the Budget frets about what the Soviets "could" fear [1] "if the U.S. deploys MIRVs and if it has the capability to expand its thin ABM system;...In turn as they introduced MIRVs and a thick ABM, [2] our own forces would have to be expanded;...For these reasons, a decision [3] to continue with the already-approved MIRV and ABM programs could lead to an unstable situation."³⁹ On the contrary, a decision not to continue with the already approved programs could lead to an unstable situation. We need the MIRV programs to deter Soviet thick ABM deployments. In seeking to divert funds from military to civilian uses, Schultz forgets that our strategic planners have already insured against the emergence of "a Greater-Than-Expected Threat," while imploring the Soviets not to move to such a threat,⁴⁰ so that his feared Step [2] has already been fully reflected in the calculations before he recounts it. When experts become overly alarmist, it is no wonder that the journalists create hysteria.

Beyond MIRV programs, we need to continue, most of all, with new means of reducing the vulnerability of our retaliatory forces. Technology never stands still. Four years of evidence about large Soviet military outlays under a permissive Brezhnev-Kosygin regime have now made it clear that, in capability terms, we face a more formidable potential enemy than before. Yesterday's survivability

measures for our strategic retaliatory forces will no longer be good enough. Modernization programs are imperative to meet the changing threat, although these need not involve forces expanded in terms of numbers of bombers or missile launchers. Very possibly their aggregate number will decline.

A decline in the aggregate number of bombers and missile launchers, plus mutual restriction to thin rather than thick ABM deployments by the two superpowers, will not satisfy the non-superpowers who protest shrilly against discrimination in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But then, nothing will satisfy the shrillest among them. We need to make it clear that we seek to lessen the pace of actual nuclear proliferation in the world, for which purpose the NPT is but one means among many. To deter proliferation in ways that supplement the NPT, a U.S./Soviet agreement at a new plateau of bipolar strategic equilibrium, with mutual MIRVs and thin ABMs, promises also to be effective.

A modest would-be nuclear power, one that aspires to retaliatory capabilities only against minor neighbors, must then weigh the thought that superpower nuclear guarantees to NPT signers level unquestionably credible retaliatory threats at him, because he totally lacks any counter-threat. For the more ambitious "all-azimuth" nuclear powers, retaliatory capabilities against a superpower will now carry a distinctly higher and perhaps prohibitive price tag, as they seek survivability and penetrability against MIRVs and ABMs. As sovereign powers, each will make his own choice. For world stability, the incentive structure will have been tilted in the right direction. In any event, to back our nuclear guarantees, we need appropriate plans and capabilities for "light" retaliation, made more credible by a posture that discourages possible enemies from comparably light attacks against us.

VII

Many will find our survey gloomy, because nuclear war has at least been deterred for over a generation. Some may also find it chauvinistic,

because the rationale for light strategic retaliatory preparedness is put in terms that protect us at all times better than we protect allies. To any who take this view, the American reply should be as emphatic as politeness permits.

Nobody, of course, can forecast our possible enemies' intentions for a decade or more with confidence. Meanwhile, tinder for unintended fires (for example, lack of peace settlements in Central Europe, the Mid-East, Korea, and Southeast Asia) is abundant. Under such circumstances, the moral ideal is collectively supplied defense capabilities whose adequacy permits us to fulfill our commitments, and yet to have a "no-first-use" doctrine for nuclear weapons. No American Administration has pressed such an extreme doctrine. But since the "New Look" of 1961, we have sought to lessen excessive dependence upon nuclear "first use," and have conspicuously led the way in hard efforts to create conventional alternatives. If those with abundant resources, especially in NATO Central Europe, find their security inadequate, they need look no farther for an explanation than to their own obstructionism, inefficiency, and utter failure as governments to generate alternative constructive designs. An American President needs to school himself in patience to meet concurrent complaints from abroad about U.S. "hegemony" and "lack of leadership." But he need lose no sleep brooding about U.S. failures to adopt constructive proposals from allied governments.

Our allies, of course, have valid complaints, and one recurring theme in this paper is directly related to them. We need detailed military designs for efficiency, and an effective policy-policing bureaucratic organization to get them. By default, NATO has mostly turned to the United States for its designs, and has good reason to be displeased with some of the results. The grand solution, of course, is a profound reorganization of NATO, so that it could generate good designs with no invidiously nationalistic name-tags pinned to any of them. For the long term, that is surely the preferred solution. But it is too long-term and nebulous for our present purposes, worthy as it remains in its own right.⁴¹

In simplest terms, in NATO there is little concurrent planning in depth which marries force and financial planning, and which provides compelling incentives and staffing in the search for cost-effective means of performing military tasks. NATO lacks a Ministry of Defense, in short. When NATO Ministers want to discuss ABM issues, for example, they must draw upon national (mainly American) inputs to the Nuclear Planning Group, the most constructively useful of NATO organizational consultative innovations. The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, specifically, has a huge operational job in meshing the forces of many nations for possible contingencies. It is understandable that he is inadequately staffed for long-term design of weapon systems and forces.

So, perforce, NATO, and still more our less-developed alliances, look to America for design. Our design for armies changes continually of course, but what is striking is the conceptual continuity that spans our "New Looks" of 1953 and of 1961. The reasons are twofold. First, soldiers do and should design armies. The U.S. Army, like its sister Services, is a continuing body whose dedicated members preserve an outlook that spans the expected duty-time of several Secretaries of Defense. Further, theirs is an exacting profession, with deep dependence upon continually renewed conventional combat experience and expertise. This experience also yields an understandable stress upon the "effectiveness" that reduces casualties among their troops in performing assigned missions. Where a rude "defense intellectual" might preface his argument for an advanced missile system design with, "General, I have fought as many nuclear wars as you have," he cannot so defend his army design. Additionally, his perennial difficulty in getting equal emphasis upon the "cost" in cost-effectiveness comparisons of future military designs is here compounded.

Second, the American Services under both "New Looks" have perceived constraints upon their size, expressed in force structure units: numbers of divisions, air wings, attack carriers, and the like. While urged under the McNamara system to examine all trade-offs between quality and quantity, many officers doubtless feared that proposing a

less expensive aircraft as more efficient, for example, might penalize rather than reward them. Their proposal might well be, at a constant budget level, to take the resultant efficiency gains in terms of more aircraft within more wings. Their fear might be that numerical constraints upon force size would not, however, be affected at all, in which case both their total budget and aggregate effectiveness would drop. A bureaucratic inclination, in consequence, may be to crowd more expensive equipment within a given number of units ("gold-plating") than is, in a broader perspective, efficient.

How, then, do we move our bureaucracies to consider fully and fairly all the trade-offs that might efficiently yield more combat units, in a manner that will be persuasive to our allies? One answer is for an American Secretary of Defense to send a memorandum, for example, to the Department of the Army somewhat as follows: "Effective 'X' months from today, I order that the Soviet model for Army design be adopted as the standard for U.S. Army design, from top to bottom, at least for European contingencies, with a phasing period of no more than 'Y' years in which to accomplish the complete transition. However, this order will be rescinded or modified at any time within 'X' months, if, to my satisfaction, you present more cost-effective designs than the Soviet model. I, expect, of course, that you can and will provide such improved designs. For this planning purpose, you are to assume that current long-term (post-Vietnam) policy guidance for combat contingencies remains as now stated, and that budgetary outlays for General Purpose Land Forces will average 'Z' billions of dollars per year for the next decade. My staff and I look forward to continuous consultation about this extremely important matter. In particular, we expect your analysis to provide the professional foundation for U.S. proposals for NATO ground force redesign, as we invite counter-proposals from our allies."

The Pentagon might be stunned by such a shock treatment. Have not less radical means, however, been exhausted? With the pride of the U.S. Army thus stung by a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, its superb competence would be mobilized and motivated, in all

probability, to generate improved force designs. Much of it they have already done. After eight years of but partly rewarding haggling within NATO about appropriate relative measures for NATO/Warsaw Pact military inputs, we need solid arguments about improved outputs that will persuade European generals. The gravity of the goal, a less dangerous because more efficient theater posture, justifies the bureaucratic friction.

Concurrently, of course, our top policy-makers would be continuously asking whether the capabilities are needed. It is our allies, monitored by an impatient U.S. Congress, who will ultimately answer this question. Hopefully, they will answer after American good faith has been demonstrated anew in the most constructive way. To supply better blueprints for overseas defense is much better than to exhort. To repeat, the blueprints would stress peacetime economies through greater dependence on mobilization and lift capabilities. Hence, they would be compatible with generally prevailing beliefs about the current state of tension, and with such further redeployment of U.S. forces from Europe as could be demonstrated to mesh with the timetable for matching West European mobilization.

The military goal would be to create a posture that, when mobilized, would not be dangerously dependent upon nuclear initiatives. From the bargaining position of such a posture, let us negotiate as much reciprocal arms reduction and inspection in Europe with the Warsaw Pact as we can. The cynics on both sides of the Iron Curtain, of course, will expect to see unilateral reductions in NATO capabilities, unaccompanied by a constructive redesign, and they may well be right. If so, however, let us so conduct ourselves that the onus rests squarely upon European NATO shoulders. Then we shall all save money, with a clearer conscience.

From the "New Look" of 1969 we can certainly expect great attention to NATO, and much consultation prior to any abrupt action. The imminent pressure to cut our long-term General Purpose Forces will relate to Asia. Disillusion with Vietnam has revived the

post-Korea "never again a land war on the mainland of Asia" slogan more powerfully than ever: For example, "we should determine our force needs on the basis of more modest plans. These plans would include the capability of meeting simultaneously on short notice a large troop requirement in Europe and a small one elsewhere in the world."⁴² Such an explicit disavowal of a capability to meet a concurrent major capability in Asia would clarify matters for our military planners, while virtually repudiating our current commitments, specifically, to South Korea and Thailand on the mainland.

The aspiration for regional self-defense in Asia, as a counterweight to mainland China, is as natural as its counterpart dream for Europe. Regrettably, it is far less feasible. Granted, after Vietnam, any American President should and will be most reluctant to involve American troops in counterinsurgency operations. Yet for long-term U.S. force planning, capabilities to meet overt invasion in Asia must be explicitly posed as a goal or else rejected. Two questions arise. If we reject this current goal, who will replace the capability? If nobody replaces it, will not the non-existent capability possibly tempt the Chinese toward less cautious behavior than we have observed? As to replacement capabilities, the skeptics note Asian internal governmental instability, lack of relevant resources, and distrust of one another, rather than any compelling Monnet-like thrust toward effective unity.⁴³ Surely they are correct in doubting the feasibility of Asian self-replacement of the U.S. capability, which leaves the second question open.

An explicit repudiation of a capability to fulfill Asian commitments would do more than depreciate the general currency of our pledges elsewhere. Specific Asian domino effects are involved. After a year of doubt about whether the new Australian Government would supply its appropriate link in a chain of related forward defenses in Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand have agreed to maintain military forces in Malaysia and Singapore after the withdrawal of British defenses there in 1971: "A possible American involvement in Canberra's thinking on Southeast Asian defense was strongly hinted by Mr. Gorton. The Prime Minister declared that Australia would seek

the support of 'outside powers' if a situation arose in which Malaysia and Singapore needed help beyond Australia's resources.⁴⁴ Here staunch ANZUS allies stand willing to maintain a forward presence that is politically more acceptable than an American presence, and better fitted by relevant experience and specialized skill. Nor need we maintain any sizable peacetime presence in Thailand, for it is not desired by the Thai government, but only an ability to bring our General Purpose forces to bear quickly if ever overt invasion occurs or appears clearly imminent. Fortunately, China's capability to invade across formidable geographic obstacles, unlike her capability to defend her own territory, is not large. Furthermore, we can plan flexibly to meet a threat where and if it develops, rather than be rigidly committed to forward defense of extended boundaries at all times. Consequently, the resource demands upon our General Purpose Forces for Asian contingencies can be modest, while our peacetime presence can be unobtrusive.

For post-Vietnam policy, therefore, we argue for a better implemented "New Look" like that of 1961 in emphasizing flexible response and in providing policy guidance for contingencies that our forces, with those of our allies, should be designed to meet. Nothing less seems prudent. For all the pressures upon our resources, such a policy would demand roughly no more than 7 percent of our growing GNP, consistent with continuing modernization of our forces.⁴⁵ Perhaps explicit arms control agreements will cut this burden further, as we all desire. Nonetheless, the neo-isolationists may well prevail, but not, one trusts, without a struggle with our new Administration: "It will be no small thing if America's enemies come to the conclusion that the Americans abandoned a major policy because they could not stand seeing what war looks like on television."⁴⁶

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¹Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors. Papers are reproduced by The RAND Corporation as a courtesy to members of its staff.

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